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Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parvin asserts that the district court erred when it 
found that his attorney's conduct was not deficient for a number of reasons, including its 
contention that the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion in State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184 (Ct. 
App. 1998) and its progeny, have failed to inform defense attorneys of what is required 
of them in order to prevent a district court from losing jurisdiction over Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 motions. He filed a Reply Brief in response to the State's brief, in which he took 
issue with a number of the State's arguments. 
After oral argument was set in this matter, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
Murphy v. State (Docket No. 40483) became final, and this Court issued an order 
vacating oral argument and providing Mr. Parvin the opportunity to file supplemental 
briefing on what affect, if any, Murphy has on his case. (Order (July 9, 2014).) This 
Supplemental Appellant's Brief is necessary to explain why the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Murphy does not bar Mr. Parvin from obtaining relief on appeal. 
Mr. Parvin will not restate the argument and facts contained in his Appellant's 
and Reply Briefs, except as necessary, as this brief is intended solely to address the 
issue of whether he is barred from obtaining relief under Murphy. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
As relevant to this Supplemental Appellant's Brief and as contained in his 
Appellant's Brief, the course of proceedings of this case is as follows: 
Following his loss on direct appeal, Mr. Parvin filed a timely Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, in which he alleged, inter alia, that his Rule 35 
counsel was ineffective for "failing to ensure that his Rule 35 motion was 
ruled upon in a reasonable period of time." (R., p.114.) Due to a 
1 
complete lack of representation by appointed counsel on his initial 
Petition, his Petition was dismissed for failure to take action on the matter, 
including failing to respond to a notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.114.) 
When Mr. Parvin learned of the dismissal, he filed a successive Petition in 
which he reasserted the Rule 35 claim and alleged that his successive 
Petition was proper because his post-conviction counsel had failed to take 
any action on his case. (R., pp.114-15.) The district court ruled that 
Mr. Parvin's successive Petition was proper, but erroneously denied the 
claim because it believed that it should have been raised on direct appeal. 
(R., p.115.) In an unpublished opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
vacated the dismissal, and remanded the matter for a decision on the 
merits. PaJVin v. State, 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 453 (April 30, 
2012),1 pp.7-8. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.2-3.) 
In concluding that Mr. Parvin was entitled to a decision on the merits of his 
successive petition, the district court explained: 
The record is clear and undisputed that Shari Dodge was appointed 
conflict counsel on October 21, 2005 and filed nothing on Parvin's behalf 
at anytime [sic] prior to the action being dismissed on February 26, 2007. 
Especially notable is the fact that Ms. Dodge failed to respond to the 
Notice of Proposed Dismissal filed on January 24, 2007. Her failure to do 
so resulted in the action being dismissed, thus denying Parvin the 
opportunity to have his action decided on the merits. Parvin has alleged, 
and it is not disputed, that Ms. Dodge failed to contact him at all, but 
specifically failed to inform him that his case had been dismissed. Thus, 
Parvin's attempt to appeal the dismissal of the action was denied as being 
untimely. The court finds that had Ms. Dodge acted appropriately within 
her role as conflict counsel in this action, Parvin's first post conviction 
proceeding would not have been dismissed on the grounds of failure to 
prosecute. Parvin was denied of the opportunity afforded to him pursuant 
to I.C. 19-4901 et seq . .. the court finds that Parvin was justified in filing 
the second post conviction action (CV-2008-97123-C) because he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in his first post conviction action 
because the action was dismissed for counsel's failure to take any action 
on his behalf. This court's finding allows the court to have the 2008 
petition relate back to the filing deadlines of the 2003 petition. 
(38295 R} pp.155-56.) 
1 A copy of the opinion is in the appellate record. (SeeR., pp.113-20.) 
2 The record in Docket No. 38295 has been judicially noticed by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in this appeal. (Order Taking Judicial Notice.) 
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ISSUE 
Court's decision in Murphy preclude Mr. Parvin from obtaining 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision In Murphy Does Not Preclude Mr. Parvin From 
Obtaining Relief On Appeal 
In Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 309, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), the Idaho Supreme 
Court overruled its decision in Palmer v. Oermitt, 102 Idaho 591 ( 1981 ), in which it had 
"concluded that an allegation of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel 
may provide sufficient reason under I.C § 19-4908 to permit allegations of error at trial 
not previously raised or inadequately raised in the initial application to be raised in a 
subsequent post-conviction application." Murphy, 156 Idaho at _, 327 P.3d at 370 
(citing Palmer, 102 Idaho at 596). In overruling Palmer, the Court reasoned, "[B]ecause 
Murphy has no statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel, she cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition 
based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel." /d., 156 Idaho at , 327 P.3d at 
371. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently held that, when a petition for post-
conviction relief is dismissed for lack of prosecution by appointed post-conviction 
counsel, a petitioner may obtain relief by way of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 
See Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731 (2010). In Eby, Mr. Eby's petition was dismissed for 
lack of prosecution pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c) after "years of shocking and disgraceful 
neglect of his case by a series of attorneys appointed to represent" him. Eby, 148 Idaho 
at 732. Mr. Eby sought relief, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b), which the district court 
concluded it could not provide. /d. at 734. In concluding that I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief can 
be available to post-conviction petitioners who have had their petitions dismissed for 
lack of prosecution by court-appointed post-conviction counsel, the Idaho Supreme 
4 
Court, "recogniz[ing] and reiterat[ing] today that there is no right to effective assistance 
of counsel in post-conviction cases," reasoned, 
[W]e are also cognizant that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is 
"the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction or 
sentence" other than by direct appeal. Given the unique status of a post-
conviction proceeding, and given the complete absence of meaningful 
representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to advance 
constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that 
this case may present the "unique and compelling circumstances" in which 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted. 
/d. at 737 (citations omitted). The basis upon which Mr. Eby urged application of 
I.R.C.P. 60(b) was "that being prevented a meaningful opportunity to present his claim 
through the inaction of his state-provided attorney would be a denial of his due process 
rights and would constitute grounds for relief from judgment based on I.R.C.P. 60(b )(6)." 
/d. at 737. 
The Court explained that its holding was "limited in scope, and has potential 
application only to post-conviction relief proceedings, rather than all civil cases" 
because, typically, "parties are bound by the actions (and failures to act) of their 
attorneys." /d. at 736. In a typical civil case, for which monetary damages are at issue, 
"when [an attorney's] representation falls below professional standards, the usual 
course of action is not to vacate the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b), but to allow a 
malpractice suit against the attorney." /d. at 737 (citation omitted). 
The holding in Eby, which recognized the lack of a right to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel and was, therefore, not based on a right to the 
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, is entirely consistent with the Court's 
more recent decision in Murphy.3 The key distinguishing factor between the two 
3 Lending further support to the continuing viability of Eby is that while the Murphy 
decision cites to Eby for the principle that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a request for 
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situations is in Murphy, the concerned whether the ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel in litigating original post-conviction petition provided a basis 
for reinstating dismissed claims, while the issue in Eby and Mr. Parvin's case is whether 
the complete lack of action by court-appointed post-conviction counsel resulting in 
judgments of dismissal for want of prosecution implicates a district court's discretionary 
power to set aside such default judgments under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
when doing so is appropriate to vindicate a post-conviction petitioner's constitutional 
right to due process of law. 
Although in Mr. Parvin's case, the district court did not explicitly rely on I.R.C.P. 
60(b )(6) in allowing him to revive the claims raised in his original post-conviction 
petition, the reasoning that it applied in doing so mirrors that expressed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Eby, namely that it was through no fault of his own that he was 
deprived of the opportunity to obtain a decision on the merits. Even, then, assuming 
Murphy prevents the litigation of a successive petition on such facts, the district court's 
decision to allow Mr. Parvin's claims to be reinstated can be said to be "right for the 
wrong reason" based on I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). See State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704 
(1997) ("Where the district court's order is correct but based upon an erroneous legal 
theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory.") (citation omitted); see also 
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463 (Ct. App. 2010) ("When a ruling in a criminal 
case is correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it may be sustained upon the 
proper legal theory.") (citation omitted). 
court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion of the trial court," Murphy, 156 Idaho 
at_, 327 P.3d at _369 (citing Eby, 148 Idaho at 738), the Court never expresses any 
statement disapproving of, or overruling, its decision in Eby. /d. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his original briefing, Mr. Parvin 
respectfully requests that this Court reach the merits of his claim and grant him the relief 
requested: restoration of the original Rule 35 relief granted to him. 
DATED this 201h day of August, 2014. 
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